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Norris: Art or Artifice: The Second Circuit's Misapplication of the Fair

ART OR ARTIFICE: THE SECOND
CIRCUIT'S MISAPPLICATION OF THE
FAIR USE FACTORS IN CARIOU V.
PRINCE IN LIGHT OF KIENITZ V.
S CONNIE NA TION
I. INTRODUCTION

Fair use exists to prevent inequity. It creates a liability exception to ensure the greatest benefit to society in situations where
upholding the rights of the copyright holder causes more harm
than good. There is an inherent tension in fair use decisions between the desire to uphold the rights of copyright holders and the
desire to let artists build off of each other's work. Both are central
to the purpose of copyright law and it is difficult to determine how
to balance those interests to further the Congressional goal of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.' When a use is
fair and when it is infringing is not easy to decide and it makes
sense for the courts to apply a flexible standard, looking to the
facts of each case and applying more than one factor to determine
the overall fairness of a use. However, where there is no predictability in the application of the fair use doctrine, there is no reliable
protection for artists on either side of the equation.
Through a series of decisions, the Second Circuit has
placed increasing significance on the "transformativeness" of a
work, gradually allowing appropriation artists to borrow more and
more freely from other artists' works without any legal consequences.2 The Second Circuit's approach to fair use recognizes
the importance of providing artists with access to past works and
emphasizes the importance of free expression; but it fails to place a

U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (2014).
2 See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2nd Cir. 2006); see also CastleRock
En-

tertainment v. CarolPubl'g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
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far art appropriation can go before it becomes inlimit upon how
3
fringement.
The Second Circuit's recent art appropriation cases fail to
draw a distinction between "fair" uses that borrow from original
works for the sake of commentary or the evolution of art and infringing uses that constitute copying merely for the sake of commercial gain. The Second Circuit no longer requires appropriation
artists to assert a particular purpose.4 Instead, it places everincreasing weight on whether the secondary work is "transformative," practically excluding the other statutory factors and underestimating the negative commercial impact appropriation art can
have upon original works. 5 The Supreme Court asserts that fair
use must be applied on a case-by-case basis and that there are no
bright line rules. 6 However, requiring that courts avoid "bright
line rules" is different than telling courts to use no rules at all.
There is no way for litigants to predict which secondary works
constitute a fair use and which infringe when courts rely on judges' personal artistic tastes. Under such a standard, parties cannot
rely on due diligence to determine their chances of winning; they
can only bring suit and hope that a judge's aesthetic taste works in
their favor.
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation, the Seventh Circuit criticized
the Second Circuit's approach to fair use, particularly the Cariou
v. Prince decision. 7 Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit disparaged the Second Circuit's focus on the transformative
purpose of a secondary work and reasserted the Seventh Circuit's
commitment to a more traditional approach to the fair use analysis,
which involves weighing the four of the factors listed in § 107 of
the Copyright Act.8
Part II of this article gives an overview of the copyright
statute and the fair use exception. Part III discusses the Supreme
31d.
4 See Cariou v. Prince,714 F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013).
51d.
6 Campbell v.

A cuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).

7 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
81d
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Court's application of the fair use doctrine in Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music.
Part IV discusses the tension between traditional copyright and appropriation art. Part V gives a brief overview of the Second Circuit decision Cariou v. Prince and the Seventh Circuit decision
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation. Part VI analyzes the different approaches to fair use taken in Cariou and Kienitz. Part VII addresses the major problem facing the circuits when it comes to the application of the fair use defense. Part VIII suggests legal solutions
to the problems presented in this article and concludes.
II. THE COPYRIGHT STATUTE AND FAIR USE

The United States Constitution grants Congress the right
"[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writing and Discoveries." 9 This right is exercised
in part by § 106 of the Copyright Act, which gives the owners of
copyrights the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, perform,
and publicly display their works, as well as the exclusive right to
create derivatives based upon the original copyrighted work.'

9 U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (2014).
10,§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works.
Subject to sections 107 through 122 [17 USCS §§ 107 through 122], the owner
of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of
the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted

work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or
by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
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The balance between copyright protections and the First Amendment are preserved by two key safeguards: the idea/expression dichotomy 1 and the doctrine of fair use.1 2 The fair use exception is
important because, as Justice Story explained:
[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there
are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much
which was well known and used before.13
Fair use is codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, which delineates
four factors to be considered to determine when a use is fair: (1)
the purpose and character of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used,
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. 14 The Supreme Court stresses a case-by-

tural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission."
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2014).
1 The idea-expression dichotomy is based in the § 102(b) of the Copyright Act
and was developed by common law. Under the idea-expression dichotomy, only the creative expression of an author is protectable, not the underlying idea or
any facts used in creating the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see also Feist
Publ'ns,Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
12 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001)
(citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
13 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting Emerson v.
Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845)).
14 "[T]he the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such
use by reproduction in copies . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
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case analysis is necessary and that the task should not be simplified with bright-line rules. 15 All four factors are to be determined
independently then weighed together while keeping the underlying
purposes of copyright protection in mind. 16
III. THE

SUPREME COURT'S APPLICATION OF FAIR USE FACTORS

While the immediate effect of copyright protection is to
provide an economic benefit to the author, its end goal is to stimulate the creation of works for the public good. 17 When a work is
valuable to the public, the author is more likely to be compensated.
As the public interest in the work increases, so does the artist's
ability to benefit from his or her property rights through sales and
licensing. To allow the importance of dissemination to outweigh
any harm to the artist deprives artists of the opportunity to profit
from ownerships of their property at precisely the moment when
society is prepared to pay for it.' The First Amendment protects
19
the right to speak freely and to refrain from speech altogether.

made of a work in any particular case is fair use the factors to
be considered shall includeThe purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of
the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2014).
15 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
16

id
17Harper& Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (quoting

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 (1975)).
18 Id. at 559 (citing Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600, 1615 (1982)).
19 Id. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)) ("We begin with
the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all. A system which secures the right to prose-
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Fair use is not meant to circumvent that right by forcing artists to
disseminate works at a specified time or to eliminate artists' access
to compensation
A. The Purposeand Characterof the Use
The first factor of the fair use test is the purpose and character of the use of the copyrighted work. Today, courts look to
three elements to determine which party this factor favors: whether
the purpose of the use was commercial or not-for-profit, whether
the character of the use was transformative, and whether the defendant acted in good faith. 20 Section 107 lists criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research as uses
that are commonly found to be fair. 2 1 However, the list of enumerated22purposes acts a guideline, not a complete list of uses that
are fair.
1. Commercial or Nonprofit Use
Congress has resisted attempts to narrow the traditional fair
use inquiry, refusing to adopt categories that presumptively decide
the question of fair use without weighing all of the statutory factors. 23 Accordingly, whether a use is for a commercial or nonprofit purpose is just one element of the first factor inquiry that must

lytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the con-

comitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right
to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept
of 'individual freedom of mind."') (citations omitted).
20 See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; see also Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
21 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.
22 id.
23 Harper & Row Publrs., 471 U.S. at 561; See H. R. Rep. No. 83, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 37 (1967); Patry 477, n. 4. The Supreme Court looked to the Congressional Record and noted that the "drafters resisted pressures from special interest groups to create presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-case analysis."
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be weighed in light of all of the other elements. 24 So, the fact that
a work is for a nonprofit educational use does not totally insulate it
from a finding of infringement, nor does a commercial use demand
a finding against fair use. 25 The important inquiry is not whether
the secondary work is created solely for monetary gain, but whether the creator of the secondary work unfairly profits from the use
of someone else's work.26 Where a use is de minimis, or does not
meaningfully damage the value of the copyrighted work, the use
may be fair even when the secondary work is sold for a profit
when enough elements weigh in the secondary artist's favor.
2. Transformative Use
A work is transformative when, instead of supplanting the
original work, it has a different character or purpose and alters the
original work by with new expression, meaning, or message.
Where the original work is used as "raw material" to create "new
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings," the
secondary work is transformative. 28 Where the original work is
merely quoted to repackage or republish the original, the secondary work is not transformative and therefore unlikely to pass the
fair use test. 29 Transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a
finding of fair use, but transformative uses lie at the heart of the
fair use doctrine. The more transformative a work is, the less significance the court places on other factors, including commercial30
ism, that normally weigh against a finding of fair use.
24 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.

Id. "[T]he mere fact that a use is educational and not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more than the commercial character
of a use bars a finding of fairness." Id. Such a presumption "would swallow
nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of §107 . . .
since these activities are generally conducted for profit in this country." (quoting
Harper
& Row, supra,at 592) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26
25

Harper,471 U.S. at 562.

27 id.
281d
29 id.
30

id
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In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Supreme Court held that
the commercial nature of a parody was only one element to be
3
weighed when conducting the fair use enquiry. ' It determined
that the central purpose of the first fair use factor is to determine
32 It
whether and to what extent a new work is transformative.
found that the threshold question for the fair use defense was
whether the parodic character, or the comment on the original
work, could reasonably be perceived. 33 Under the Court's reasoning, where the commentary of the secondary work has no critical
bearing on the original work and the secondary artist used the elements of the original work to avoid the necessity of coming up
with something original, the claim to fair use is diminished34and
more weight.
other factors including commercialism are given
3. Good Faith
In addition to the commerciality and transformative elements, courts look to whether the defendant acted in good or bad
faith. In Harper, "[flair use presupposes 'good faith' and 'fair
dealing ,,35 and distinguishes between "a true scholar and a chiseler who infringes a work for personal profit." 36 The good faith
factor may seem simple, but it is important for analyzing the purpose and character of the secondary work.
At first glance, one may categorize any unauthorized taking
as a "bad faith" taking, but there are different motivations for borrowing from a copyrighted work. For instance, a secondary artist
who expresses indifference towards the rights of the copyright
31 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572 (where the Supreme Court decided that rap group

2 Live Crew's commercial parody of Rob Orbison's song Oh, Pretty Woman
for the fair use defense).
qualified
32
1d. at 579.
33
Id.at 582.
34

1 d. at 580.
35 Harper, 471 U.S. at 562 (quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Associates, 293
F. Supp. 130, 146 (SDNY 1968), quoting Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision
of the Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832 (1968)).
36 Id.(quoting Wainwright Securities Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558
F.2d at 94 (2d Cir. 1978)).
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holder and copies from an original solely for the sake of profit
lacks any sign of good faith. An artist who makes an honest attempt to license a copyrighted work or misunderstood what the
rights of the copyright holder were, on the other hand, might have
a good
faith argument and, by extension, an argument for fair
37
use.

B. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, distinguishes between those works that lie at the heart of copyright
protection and those that receive a thinner shield from infringement. Two types of distinctions have emerged for evaluating this
factor: (1) whether the work is expressive or creative rather than
predominantly factual; and (2) whether the work is published or
unpublished.38 Works of fiction or great creativity generally receive more protection than factual or information works because
the law conceptualizes facts as public property but recognizes that
39
individuals have a property interest in their original expressions.
Unpublished works receive greater protection than published
works due to concerns about authors' right to privacy and right to
40
first sale.

C. The Amount and Substantialityof the Portion Used
"[N]o plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
much of his work he did not pirate."' 4 The third factor urges
courts to look to the amount and substantiality taken from the original copyrighted work, and not whether the copyrighted elements
make up a substantial part of the new work.42
37

38

1d

Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006).

39

id.
40

Harper,471 U.S. at 597-98.

41 Id. at

565 (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56

(2d 1936)).
42 id.
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While courts do not always give this factor much weight, a
work that borrows substantially from another may run into trouble
under the first and fourth factors, the character of use and the effect upon market value. A secondary work that consists predominantly of unoriginal elements is less likely to be sufficiently transformative and is more likely to cause economic harm by
superseding the original. 43 Additionally, where a substantial portion of the new work is directly copied from the original, there is
evidence of the qualitative value of the copied material both to the
copyright holder and to the infringer.44
However, excessive copying alone is not sufficient to establish infringement; context matters and requires courts to ask
45
what the secondary artist did in addition to copying the original.
Campbell recognized that a parodist must be able to copy enough
to copy at least enough to make its reference to the original work
recognizable.46 The amount a secondary artist may reasonably
copy beyond what he needs to identify the original work depends
on the purpose and character of the work and the degree of likelihood that the new work will serve as a market substitute for the
original.47

43 "A work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little

added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling de-

mand for the original." Id. at 588.
44 The Supreme Court quoted Judge Learned Hand, who remarked that "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his work he did not pirate." It found that, conversely, a verbatim taking from an original work served
to show the value of what the plagiarist did take. Id. at 565.
41 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589.

The Supreme Court recognized that a parodist must often copy the most distinctive features of an original work to make sure an audience knows what the
parodist is commenting upon. The Court found that the amount that is reasonable for a parodist to take beyond that which is necessary for identification of the
original work must be judged on a case-by-base. Id. at 588.

46

47

id.
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D. Effect upon the PotentialMarketfor the Value of the
Copyrighted Work
In Harper, the Court said that the fourth factor, the effect
of the use upon the potential market for the value of copyrighted
work, is "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use.''48 The Court held that fair use was limited to copying that
does not materially impair the marketability of the original work.
An infringer who combines infringing and noninfringing elements
"must abide by the consequences" unless he can show that his
profits stem from his original creative elements, not the infringing
portions of the work 9 Under Harper,once a copyright holder establishes a reasonable causal connection between the infringement
and a loss of revenue, the burden shifts to the infringer to show
that the damage would have occurred even without the taking of
50
the copyrighted expression.
The fourth factor considers both actual and potential harm
to the market for the original work and derivatives, which the copyright holder has the exclusive rights to.51 Courts must consider
not just the alleged harm caused, but also whether widespread use
of the copyrighted material would cause substantial harm to the
original market because minor infringements add up. 52 An isolated infringement may not cause much harm, but many small infringements taken in the aggregate cause serious damae to the
market for a work, which copyright law seeks to prevent.
In Campbell, the Court distinguished between "potentially
remediable displacement" and "irremediable disparagement" by
looking to whether the infringing use effected a market copyright
54
holders would generally develop or license others to develop.
The Campbell Court backed away from the language of Sony Cor-

48 Harper,471 U.S. at 566 (citing 3 Nimmer § 13.05[A] and cases cited therein).
49
1 d. at
50 id.

567.

5'See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; see also Harper,471 U.S. at 539.
52 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589.
53 Harper,471

U.S. at 569 (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-473, 65 (1975)).
U.S. at 592.

54 Campbell, 510
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poration of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., which held
that every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively unfair because it unfairly violates the monopoly privilege of the
copyright owner. 55 Instead, Campbell held that where there is
complete duplication of a work, the secondary work clearly supersedes the original, serving as a market replacement and making it
likely that market harm will occur. 56 Where the second use is
transformative, market substitution is less certain and harm may
not be so readily inferred.57
E. Weighing the Factors
In both Harperand Campbell, the Supreme Court reiterates
that the fair use factors are weighed together and analyzed on a
case-by-case basis. 58 The standard is intended to be flexible, and
the fair use doctrine requires courts to avoid the rigid application
of the copyright statute where it would stifle creativity. 59 However, it is important to remember that fair use is an affirmative defense. An infringer must have a legitimate reason for copying to
qualify for the fair use defense and must meet the burden of proving that he or she did not unjustly usurp the copyright holder's
market. 60 Unfortunately, determining whose motives for copying
are "good" and whose motives are "bad" is difficult business,
which is why copyright issues arise for appropriation artists.

55 In Sony, the Supreme Court held that the sale of video tape recorders to the

public did not constitute copyright infringement because the recorders were capable of non-infringing uses. The Court held that every commercial use is presumptively unfair but determined that the practice of "time shifting" to watch
live TV at a later time did not constitute a commercial use. Sony Corp. ofAm. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
56 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
57 Id. The Supreme Court explained that some secondary uses, such as the criticism used in a bad movie review, may diminish the demand for the original
work. However, the Court found that it is the purpose of the court to distinguish
biting criticism that suppressed demand and infringement that usurps it.
between
58
1d. at 577 (citing Harper,471 U.S. at 560).
59 Id.
60

Harper,471 at 566.
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IV. APPROPRIATION ART

According to the Tate Glossary, "[a]ppropriation in art and
art history refers to the practice of artists using pre-existing objects
or images in their art with little transformation of the original., 61
It is hotly debated whether appropriation art is art in and of itself
with enough social value to qualify for fair use or whether appropriation art is artistic theft that allows secondary artists to piggyback off of the work of original artists without paying for the privilege of doing so.
§107 of the Copyright Act lists "purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teachin§.., scholarship, or research" as
likely to be considered fair uses. It is argued that appropriation
art serves as commentary because it criticizes society's consumption and the oversaturation of images related to consumption in
everyday life. Some appropriation artists take consumer-related
images and place them in different context to comment critically
on the consumer values that are advanced by popular images, especially those in advertising. 63 Yet, many pieces of appropriation
art only comment on larger societal64issues rather than the works
which they copy, as required by law.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed appropriation art and whether commenting on society rather than upon the particular work appropriated or the artist of that work is sufficient to raise the fair use defense. Campbell indicates that
general social commentary is not enough: a parodist's right to
quote from existing works exists because, by definition, parodies
comment upon the original work. 65 Where a secondary work borrows from an original work not to comment on that work but instead to avoid the effort required to come up with something new,

61

Tate, Glossary: Appropriation,Tate (Nov. 8, 2014),

http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/online-resources/glossary/a/appropriation.
62 17 U.S.C. § 107.
63 E. Kenly Ames, Notes: Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard For
Appropriation,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1482 (1993).
64
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992).
65 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
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the secondary artist's claim that the borrowing was fair "diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger." 66 So, while failing to
comment upon an original work does not necessarily doom a claim
to fair use, it makes that the potential infringer's assertion of the
defense far more difficult.
A. Rogers v. Koons
In Rogers v. Koons, the Second Circuit found that famous
appropriation artist Jeff Koons was not entitled to a fair use defense.67 The court found that Koons' work was not immunized
under a parody claim because, while the work parodied modem
society, it failed to comment upon the original work Koons copied.68 To use the parody defense, a parody must be able to conjure
up at least enough of the original work for a viewer to recognize
what is commented upon. 69 The Second Circuit maintained a rule
requiring some comment upon the original work because, without
such a rule, there would be no practical limit to the fair use defense.70
B. Castle Rock
Since Rogers v. Koons, the Second Circuit has backed
away from rigidly requiring commentary upon the particular original work rather than larger societal issues. Notably, Castle Rock
Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group shifted the focus to
whether or not the work was transformative, particularly in its pur66

-d.

67

Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 1992).

Koons' created sculpture called "String of Puppies" based off of artist Art
Rogers' photograph, "Puppies." The sculpture was a faithful copy of the original, which Koons told his staff "must be just like the photo." Koons asserted
that his secondary work was fair social criticism of society as a whole, commenting on the political and economic system created by the mass production of
commodities and media images. Id. at 309.
69 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
70
Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310.
68
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pose. 7 1 The court attempted to address the confusion surrounding
the term "transformation" stating that "[a]lthough derivative works
that are subject to the author's copyright transform an original
work into a new mode of presentation, such works-unlike works
of fair use-take expression for purposes that are not 'transformative.' ' 72 This explanation is not particularly edifying. The implication that "transformation" depends on the intent or "purpose" of
the author rather than the actual substance of the secondary work
makes for a difficult standard. Under this reasoning secondary
works could be nearly identical to the original and still be considered "transformative" as long as the secondary artist alleged a different purpose than the original artist. This is problematic because
it is easy to come up with some post-hoc reason for copying another artist's work whenever an infringement suit arises. Almost
no secondary artist would intend to send the exact same message
as an original artist, and, while some purposes might tend to make
a work transformative, Castle Rock fails to differentiate between
fair use and possible infringement.
C. Blanch v. Koons
The reasoning in Castle Rock was continued in Blanch v.
Koons, where the Second Circuit ruled in Jeff Koons' favor. 73 The
71

The Castle Rock case involved a trivia book based on the television show

Seinfeld. The defendant creators of the trivia book tried to argue that the book
was transformative and critically commented upon the original work. The court
found that the first factor, the purpose and character of use, weighed against the
defendants because creating the trivia book only required minimal creativity and
had little or no transformative purpose. The point of the book was to provide
Seinfeld fans with more access to Seinfeld content, not to comment upon the
"nothingness" of the show, which the defendants attempted to assert as a purpose. Castle Rock Entertainment v. CarolPubl'g Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.
1998).
72
1d. at 143.
73 In Blanch v. Koons, Jeff Koons based a painting on a photograph
from a
commercial magazine. He had a series of paintings that superimposed advertising images against pastoral backgrounds. Koons asserted that his purpose for
using the photograph was different than Blanch's purpose for creating it. Koons
wanted the viewer to think about his or her personal experiences with objects,
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court cited Castle Rock, finding that where the secondary work
used copyrightable expression as raw material to create new information, aesthetics, insights, and understandings it is the type of
activity allowed by the fair use doctrine.74 Under this standard,
Koons merely needed to have some new meaning, message, or
75
aesthetic for the first fair use factor to weigh in his favor. Simply
articulating the work's purpose of social commentary was suffi76
cient against infringement in the eyes of the court.
However, because Blanch is a circuit court decision, all
courts need not follow it. When a secondary artist is able to claim
any original purpose, however minimal, is embodied in a work that
copies protection for the original work ceases to exist. There must
be some practical boundary to fair use, but the Second Circuit has
yet to articulate one. Instead, Blanch's standard simply allows appropriation artists to ignore copyright protections and hide under
the broad shield of "transformation."
V. SUMMARIES OF CARIOU AND KENITZ

Cariou v. Prince is the latest in a series of Second Circuit
decisions regarding the fair use defense for appropriation art. In
Cariou, the Second Circuit moved further away from the traditional statutory test for fair use, relying heavily upon the concept of
transformative use to decide that an appropriation artist's use of
original works was fair. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation is a recent Sev-

products, and images. The original purpose of the photograph was advertising.
The court found that the drastic difference between the original and secondary
purposes made Koons' secondary work transformative.

Blanch v. Koons, 467

F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).

74 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 252 (quoting CastleRock Entm 't, 150 F.3d at 142).
75 id.

"Koons is, by his own undisputed description, using Blanch's image as fodder
for his commentary on the social and aesthetic consequences of mass media. His
stated objective is thus not to repackage Blanch's 'Silk Sandals,' but to employ
it 'in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.' When, as here, the copyrighted work is used as "raw material," in the
furtherance of distinct creative or communicative objectives, the use is transformative." Id. at 253.
76
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enth Circuit opinion that directly criticizes the Second Circuit's
approach in Cariou and provides the court's reasoning for its continued reliance on the fair use factors laid out in § 107.
A. CariouFacts
Professional photographer Patrick Cariou spent six years
living among the Rastafarians in Jamaica, taking photographs that
he published in a book, Yes, Rasta.7 7 Cariou is the sole copyright
holder in the images in the book. 78 Richard Prince, a famous appropriation artist, purchased a copy of Yes, Rasta and used the images in his own works. Prince admits to using at least 41 photos

from Cariou's book.79
Prior to Prince's unlicensed use, the photos from Yes, Rasta
had only been sold to individuals Cariou knew and had never been
licensed for use other than in the Yes, Rasta book. 80 Cariou was in
negotiation with a gallery in New York to show and sell the prints,
but the gallery cancelled the show after Prince showed his work. 81
The gallery canceled because the owner did not wish to be seen as
capitalizing on the fame of Prince's paintings
and did not want to
82
show work that had been "done already."
77 Cariouv. Prince,784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
7
8

jd.

Prince used images from Yes, Rasta to create a collection called Canal Zone.
The collection including a collage consisting of 35 photographs from Yes, Rasta
attached to a wooden board. It also included 28 paintings that incorporated images from Yes, Rasta. Some of Prince's paintings consisted almost entirely of
images from Yes, Rasta that were collaged, enlarged, cropped, tinted, or painted
over. Other paintings used photos from Yes, Rasta had more substantial original
painting and combined photos from Yes, Rasta with other appropriated photos
as part of a collage. Id. at 343-44.
79

80

Id.at 344.

81Id.

Gagosian Gallery sold eight of Prince's Canal Zone paintings for a total of
$10,480,000. Prince received 60 percent of the purchase price, and Gagosian
received the other 40 percent. Cariou received nothing. A number of other Canal Zone paintings were traded for art with a value between $6 million and $8
million. The gallery also made $6,784 in exhibition catalog sales. Id.at 344,
350-51.
82
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1. District Court Holding

The District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that Prince was not entitled to a fair use defense. 83 After determining that Cariou's photos were worthy of copyright protection, the court turned to a fair use analysis and found that all four
of fair use. 84
factors of the fair use test weighed against a finding
It granted an injunction against Prince's use of the photos and required that the defendants deliver85all of the infringing works to
Cariou for impound or destruction.
The court found that the determination of the first factor,
purpose and character of use, is composed of two factors: transformativeness and commerciality. 86 It found that Prince's works
were only transformative to the extent that they commented upon
Cariou's original works and that to the extent Prince's works only
recast, transformed, or adapted the photos absent comment, they
were infringing.8 7 It also determined that, under the second prong,
Prince's use of the photos was substantially commercial, which

The court found Prince directly liable and the gallery and gallery owner vicariously liable as contributory infringers. Id. at 342.
84 In the court's aggregate analysis, it found that none of the four factors
weighed in favor of Prince. It found that "'the monopoly created by copyright'
does not unduly 'impede referential analysis [or] the development of new ideas
out of old' when copyright law is enforced under circumstances like those prehere." Id. at 353 (citing Leval at 1109).
sented
8
1Id.at 355.
86 Id. at 347, 350.
87 Id. at 348. It found that the determination of "transformativeness" should be
83

guided by the examples given in § 107, which include criticism, comment, and
news reporting. Id. The court pointed to Castle Rock, noting that the fact that a
work "recast[s], transform[s], or adapt[s] an original work into a new mode of
presentation," making it a derivative work, does not make the work "transformative" in the sense that the first fair use factor requires. Id. (citing Castle Rock,
150 F.3d at 143). The court refused to accept the argument that appropriation
art uses original works as "raw materials" and found that [i]f an infringement of
copyrightable expression could be justified as fair use solely on the basis of the
infringer's claim to a higher or different artistic use ... there would be no practicable boundary to the fair use defense." Id. (quoting Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d
at 310).
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weighs against a finding of fair use. 88 This related to the court's
determination that the fourth factor, the effect on the potential
market for the copyrighted work, weighed against Prince because
his secondary works unfairly damaged the original market for Cariou's works, ruining his plans for exhibition, and would destroy
the potential licensing market for derivative use. 89 The second and
90
third factor were also found to favor Cariou.
a. Second CircuitReversal
The Second Circuit reversed the lower court's judgment
with regard to twenty-five of Prince's artworks, vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding
the five remaining artworks that were potentially infringing. 91 Unlike the district court, the Second Circuit found every factor
weighed in favor of Prince. 92 Under the first factor, the court
found that Prince's work was transformative and that the commerciality of the use was relatively unimportant because "[t]he more
transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of
other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use." 93 The court found that twenty-five of Prince's
works were transformative as a matter of law 94 and remanded five
to the district court to determine whether they were sufficiently

88
8 Id.at

351.
9Id.at 353.

90

Id.at 352.
91Cariou v. Prince,714 F.3d 694, 712 (2nd Cir. 2013).
92 See generally, Cariou, 714 F.3d at 694.
93 Cariou,714 F.3d at 708 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579).
94 The court said its focus was on Prince's works, not Prince's message. Id.
at
707. It found that the twenty-five works it classified as transformative had a
"different character" giving Cariou's photographs a new expression and using a
new aesthetic for distinct creative and communicative results. Id. at 708. The
court went on to say that its conclusion should not be taken to suggest that cosmetic changes alone would necessarily constitute a transformation for the purposes of fair use, but it did not greatly elaborate. Id.
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transformative. 95 The court gave little weight to the remaining
96
three factors because of the transformative nature of the work.
B. Kienitz Case Summary
In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, photographer Michael
Kienitz sued Sconnie Nation for making t-shirts and tank tops that
used a photo of Madison, Wisconsin mayor Paul Soglin that
Kienitz took at the mayor's inauguration. 97 Sconnie Nation admitted to downloading the photo from the city's website for use on its
shirts. 98 The photo was posterized, the background behind the
mayor was removed, and Soglin's face was colored lime green and
surrounded by multi-color lettering on the shirts. 99 A magistrate
judge granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that
Sconnie Nation was entitled to a fair use defense.100 . The Seventh
holding based on its application of the four
Circuit affirmed the
10 1
test.
use
factor fair
95

1d. at 712.
The court found that the second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, was
"of limited usefulness" because the creative copyrighted work was used transformatively. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710. The court found that the third factor,
amount and substantiality of the portion used, weighed in favor of Prince because it did not believe the amount taken was greater than necessary, "the law
does not require that the secondary artist take no more than is necessary," and
the secondary use must be allowed to take enough to "fulfill its transformative
purpose." Id. The court found that the fourth factor, effect upon the potential
market for the copyrighted work, also weighed in favor of Prince. It said the
factor did not look to whether the secondary use "suppresses or even destroys
the market for the original work or its potential derivatives, but whether the secondary use usurps the market of the original work." Id. at 708 (emphasis original) (quoting Blanch, 467 F.3d at 258). It found that Prince's work had not
usurped the market from the original. Id.
97 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
98
Id. at 757.

96

99 Id.

'00 Id. at 758.
101The Seventh Circuit found that only the third and fourth statutory factors had
any bite in this litigation because the character of the secondary work was political commentary and the nature of the copyrighted work was irrelevant because
Kienitz failed to argue that there was any harm to the value of his copyright.
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VI. COMPETING USES TO FAIR USE

The fair use analysis of the Second Circuit in Cariou and
the Seventh Circuit in Sconnie Nation are at odds. The Second
Circuit weighs transformative use so heavily that it effectively
dismisses all of the other factors. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit
refuses to look directly to transformative use as a factor at all, instead sticking to the traditional statutory scheme.'
While both
cases find fair use, the two courts take nearly opposite approaches
to the application of the fair use doctrine and the reasoning of the
03
two courts have vastly different implications for future cases. 1
A. What Constitutes Transformative Use?

In Cariou, the Second Circuit found that "[t]he law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the original or its author in order to be considered transformative, and a secondary
work may constitute a fair use even if it serves some purpose other
than those . . .identified in the statute."'

4

The court cites to

Campbell and Harper for support, but it is not clear that either of
those cases supports the Second Circuit's proposition. Both Campell and Harper support that a use may be fair even when it serves
some purpose other than those enumerated in §107, but Campbell
treats commentary on the original work is the key to winning the
05
first factor of the fair use test.'
A new work must generally alter the original with "new
expression, meaning, or message."' 6 Prince testified that he
"do[es]n't really have a message" and that he was not "trying to
The court determined that the third factor weighed in favor of the defendants
because only a small portion of the original work remained clearly visible; the
rest was dramatically altered. It also decided that the fourth factor weighed in
favor of the defendants because the secondary work, satirical t-shirts, did not
serve as a substitute for the original photograph. Id.at 758-60.
102See generally Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708; see also Kienitz, 766 F.3d
at 756.
103 Id.
104

Cariou,714 F.3d at 706.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
Id. at 579.

015
06

1
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create anything with a new meaning or message."' 0 7 Yet, the Cariou court found that all but five of Prince's works were transforma10 8 If
tive because they "manifest an entirely different aesthetic."
the artist does not assert any new meaning or message, the court
must rely on the new expression in the work. 10 9 Judging whether
art has new expression is a dangerous task for judges because it is
a subjective, aesthetic valuation that judges are not trained to
make. Yet, the court did not hesitate to find that Prince's justificaof how the
tions did not matter and focused instead on the question
0
observers."
reasonable
to
appeared
works
secondary
The court in Cariou looks to Campbell for support in this
assertion but misses the mark because Campbell's reasonable observer requirement was related to the amount and substantiality of
the copyrighted work taken."' Campbell held that a parodist must
be able to take enough from the original work for the reasonable
observer to perceive what the secondary work is commenting on,
not that a reasonable observer must find that a work is transformed.11 2 The leeway granted to the secondary artist in Campbell
was only granted because of the unique nature of parodies. Under
Campbell, the Court allows secondary artists to borrow enough
from an original work for audiences to understand the commentary
of the parody and to identify what the secondary work is parodizing.11 3 The Court does not explicitly state whether its permission
to borrow is limited to parodies, but it certainly does not extend to
circumstances like those in 14Cariou where there is no comment upon the original work at all."
Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707 (quoting Cariou,748 F.Supp.2d at 349).
' Id. at 706.
109 Id.at 705.
107
08

..
1 Id.at 707.
111Campbell found that the amount and substantiality a parodist may borrow
depends on how much is necessary for a reasonable observer to recognize the
original work that is being parodied. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
112 "The threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is
whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived." Campbell, 510 U.S.
at 582.
113 Id. at 588.
Id.at 582.
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B. Cariou 's Transformative Use Analysis
Once a transformative use is found, there is still the question of how heavily this element must be weighed in the overall
analysis for fair use. In Cariou the Second Circuit rested its finding of fair use based almost entirely upon this factor." 5 Once the
court determined that the work was transformative, it held that all
four statutory factors weighed in favor of the defendant. "16
Though transformative use is just one of the elements to be
considered under the purpose and character factor of the fair use
test, the court found that the transformative nature of Prince's
work outweighed his commercial purpose and his bad faith in copying. 117 The court used similar reasoning in its analysis of the other three factors. When looking to the effect on potential market for
the copyrighted work, the court followed Castle Rock, finding that
"[t]he more transformative the secondary use, the less likelihood
that the secondary use substitutes for the original [even though] the
fair use, being transformative, might well harm, or even destroy,
the market for the original."" 8 The court found that the second
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, was of "limited usefulness" where the copyrighted work is used for a transformative
purpose. 119
Lastly, under the third factor, amount and substantiality
taken, the court found that while the use of entire work does not
favor fair use, the law does not require a secondary artist take no
more of a copyrighted work than is "necessary" to complete their
new work.1 20 Because a secondary use must be permitted to borrow enough of an original work to fulfill its transformative purpose, and because Prince's use was transformative, the court held

115 See generally Cariou,714 F.3d at 694.
116
Id.at 708-10.
117 "Although there is no question that Prince's artworks are commercial,
we do
not place much significance on that fact due to the transformative nature of the

work." Id. at 708.
118
Id.at 709 (quoting Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145).
119 Cariou, 714 F.3d. at 694.
20

1 Id.
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that the third factor weighed heavily in Prince's favor. 12 1 When
the court looked to the factors as a whole,122all weighed in favor of
Prince, entitling him to a fair use defense.
C. Kienitz 's Transformative Use Analysis
In the Kienitz opinion, Judge Easterbrook was highly critical of the
Second Circuit's approach to fair use. 123 The Seventh Circuit
pointed out that "transformative use" is not one of the statutory
factors of § 107. Instead, it noted that it was a suggested subfactor the Supreme Court mentioned in Campbell.124 The Seventh
Circuit was skeptical of Cariou's approach because it effectively
replaces the factors of § 107. By focusing exclusively on whether
a work is transformative rather than applying the factors and the
Second Circuit's approach could potentially override 17 U.S.C. §
106(2).,,125 The Seventh Circuit instead chose to stick to the statutory scheme, and focus on the fourth factor, potential market
harm.

126

This is not to say that the transformative nature of a work
does not come into play in the Seventh Circuit. 127 Though the
court did not explicitly say so, it considered transformativeness in
its analysis of both the first and third factors. 12 8 Under the third
factor, the amount and substantiality taken from the original work

was minimal and these extensive changes created a transformation. 129 The court noted that the defendants removed so much
of the original work that the creative elements of original work's

121

Id.

122

Id.at 712.
Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.

121
124

iN.

Id. "The Second Circuit has run with the suggestion [from Campbell] and
concluded that 'transformative use' is enough to bring a modified copy within
scope of § 107."
the
126
125

10.

127

See generally Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 756; See also Brownmark Films. LLC v.

Comedy Partners,682 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 2012).
128 See generally Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 756.
129 id.
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author were nearly extinguished, leaving only the outline of the
mayor's face and a hint of his smile, which cannot0 be copyrighted
because it does not contain sufficient originality.13
The secondary artists at Sconnie Nation also made significant changes to the original expression of the photograph by posterizing it, removing the background, changing the colors, and surrounding the photo with multi-colored writing. 13 1 Additionally,
under the first factor, purpose and character of the work, the court
discussed the different, or transformative, purpose of the secondary work - political commentary. 132 The court found the first factor to be of little use because the statutorily favored purpose of
commentary and the commerciality of the defendants' products
33
kept the factor from weighing strongly in favor of either party. 1
D. PotentialMarket Harm
1. Cariou'sApproach
The Second Circuit found that Prince's use did not cause
significant harm to the potential market for Cariou's work for three
reasons: (1) there were significant differences between the works;
(2) the focus should be on primary, rather than derivative, markets;
and (3) Cariou had not aggressively marketed his works and was
unlikely to develop a market that overlapped with Prince's. 134 The
first finding is problematic because the differences between the
works are subjective. This relates to the issue of Cariou and
Prince's works appealing to different markets. The court notes
that Prince's sales attracted high-profile buyers,
whereas Cariou
135
made a modest $8,000 profit from his book.

130 id.

131See generally, Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 756.
132

id.

133 Kienitz. at 759. "The other statutory factors don't do much in this case. Consider (1), for example. Defendants sold their products in the hope of profit, and
made a small one, but they chose the design as a form of political commentary."
134 See generally Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.
135 Id. at 699.
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However, the fact that Prince has already captured a market
should not deprive Cariou of a chance to try to enter that market.
Prince might have been able to sell the secondary works to highend buyers because of his reputation, but those buyers also may
have made their purchases because they saw something unique
about the art itself, namely Cariou's photos. Cariou lost the opportunity to bring his works to those buyers because Prince did so first
by creating unauthorized derivatives.
2. Kienitz's Approach
In Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit determined that the fourth
factor, potential market harm, weighed in favor of the secondary
artists because t-shirts and tank tops do not substitute for original
photographs. 36 The court also noted that Kienitz did not argue
that he planned to license his work for apparel or that the secondary artists' products had reduced the demand for the original
work. 13 7 The court implies that Kienitz could have had a good
case, had he chosen to present it, because the defendants did not
need to use his copyrighted work to achieve their goal and its use
might injure Kienitz long-term commercial success by damaging
his reputation. 38 Kienitz worked with high-end clients who would
not appreciate professional photos they paid for eventually being
used in products that mock them. The defendants' satirical use of
Kienitz's photo could have a potentially negative impact on
Kienitz's future business because important clients like political
figures likely do not appreciated having photos they paid for used
to make a mockery of them down the line. 139 The defendants also
had no excuse for using the Kienitz's photo because they could
have taken their own snapshot of the mayor to use in their t-shirt
design.' 40 Kienitz's failure to raise the argument about long-term
reputational harm. led to the court finding that the defendants need
36

' Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 759.
id.

137

138 id.
139 Id.
140 ld-

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/6

26

Norris: Art or Artifice: The Second Circuit's Misapplication of the Fair

2015]

ART OR ARTIFICE

not have used Kienitz's photo insufficient to offset that hardly any
of the original work remained in the finished secondary product. 141
E. Focusing on Market Substitution
It is important to note the contrast of the approaches of the
Second and Seventh Circuits on this issue. The fourth factor, potential market harm, weighed against the copyright holder in
Kienitz, but this was in large part because the copyright holder
failed to present the right arguments. 142 Had Kienitz argued that
he planned to license his photographs for apparel and that the secondary artists' use damaged his reputation and, as a consequence,
the demand for his photographs, the Seventh Circuit likely would
have weighed the fourth factor in his favor. 143 The court even
made some of the argument for him in dicta. In Cariou, the Second Circuit's ruling against the copyright holder was not based on
his failure to make arguments. Instead, it was based on the sec144
ondary artist's "transformative use."
In Sony Corporationof America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., the Supreme Court found that commercial uses were presumptively unfair. 145 The Court has since backed away from this
reasoning, but that does not mean that the Court intended to back
away from the full use of the factor. 146 In Harper, the Supreme
Court found that the fourth factor was the most important in the
fair use inquiry. 147 In Campbell, the Court affirmatively stated

141Kienitz, at 759.
142 id.

143
Id.
144Cariou,714 F.3d at 709.
145 In Sony, the Supreme Court ruled that the sale of videotape players that allowed customers to record live television did not constitute copyright infringement. The Court found that the devices were capable of substantial noninfringing uses, in particular recording shows whose copyright holders did not mind athome recording and time shifting, which merely allowed viewers to watch live
television broadcasts at a later time. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
146 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
147 Harper,471 U.S. at 566.
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there was no presumption of infringement when a use was comtransformative works made market substitution
mercial and14that
8
less certain.
However, the Campbell court went on to say that the distinction between remediable and unremediable displacement was
whether the market that the secondary work uses is one that the
creator of the original work would typically develop or license
others to develop. 149 The Second Circuit looks to this distinction
it plays.1 50
in its Cariou reasoning but is unclear on the importance
The court decided that Prince's market was too different from Cariou's for the use to constitute usurpation, but that is not obvious to
the lay observer. 15 1 As Campbell points out, fair use is an affirmative defense. 152 The burden is on the potential infringer to show
that they did not cause market harm to the original author.' 53 Yet,
the Second Circuit decided that Prince did not harm Cariou's market without requiring Prince to carry that burden of proof.
VII. THE FAIR USE PROBLEM CREATED BY CARIOU
While the Second Circuit standard for fair use addresses
some of Congress' concerns regarding copyright law, it fails to
provide a clear distinction between fair borrowing and infringement in cases of art appropriation. The standard lacks predictabil-

148
149

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. In Campbell, the Court provides the example of

criticism. The Court states that the market for potential derivatives only includes the types of works that original creators would generally develop or license others to develop. There is no derivative market for criticism because it is
highly unlikely that authors would license others to make negative reviews. Authors do not want criticism; they want praise. So, pure criticism is not considered a derivative work. However, more complex secondary works may venture
beyond criticism and into other protectable derivative markets. In that case,
courts must look beyond the criticism to the other elements of the work to determine its fairness.
"0 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709.
151 Id.
152 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
153

id.
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ity and creates confusion among copyright holders and potential
infringers alike because the concept of "transformativeness" is too
nebulous to predict the outcome of litigation.
The Seventh Circuit provides a more workable standard. It
applies the statutory factors required by § 107, weighing all four to
reach a reasonably predictable outcome. The Second Circuit, in
contrast, really just looks at whether the secondary work is "transformative." Transformative use is not required by the Copyright
Statute and has never been expressly mandated as a new factor by
the Supreme Court. It is just one element of one of the four statutorily required factors. Determining what is transformative is
highly subjective. A court must use other factors to counterbalance transformativeness in order to create outcomes that rely on
more than judges' subjective opinions about which works are derivative and which works are "transformed." Failing to apply the
additional statutorily mandated factors ignores the importance of
the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality
taken, and the potential commercial harm caused by the unauthorized use, all of which Congress found important enough to include
in the Copyright Statute. The four-factor standard required by §
107 is not easy for courts to apply in cases with complex facts, but
brushing that test aside for a "transformative use" test is not the
right answer.
A. Subjective DeterminationsAre ProperlyMade by the Trial
Court
It is impossible to have any type of transformative use legal
standard without applying some level of subjective judgment in
deciding whether the art has been "transformed enough" to merit a
fair use defense. However, as a subjective and factual judgment,
this is best left to the trial courts, which are meant to address questions of fact. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
52(a), trials courts are to find facts specially and state conclusions
of law separately. 154 So, appellate courts are not a proper forum

154 Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a)(1)
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for overriding the aesthetic judgments of the lower courts unless
there is an egregious misapplication of the law.
The Second Circuit granted Prince a fair use defense for
twenty-five of Prince's artworks because the works had "an entirely different aesthetic" from Cariou's photographs but sent five
artworks back to the district court on remand to determine whether
or not the minimal changes made to Cariou's photographs were
sufficient to constitute fair use.1 55 The Second Circuit said these
five works, while different from Cariou's work, remained similar
in "key aesthetic ways" and determined that the district court was
the appropriate forum for determining whether the minimal alterations to the works156created enough of a transformation to render the
works a fair use.
Why then did the Second Circuit think the appellate court
is the appropriate place to decide whether the other twenty-five
works are transformative? Even if the Second Circuit disagreed
with the lower court's requirement that the secondary works in
some way comment on the original, it should have remanded all of
Prince's works for a determination of fair use in light of the Second Circuit's finding that no commentary requirement was imposed by the law.
The majority's distinction between the works it deemed
transformative and those it remanded was understandable. Subjectively, five of Prince's works remained aesthetically similar to
Cariou's original photographs while the other twenty-five involved
greater alterations. 157 Making a final determination at the appel155
56

Cariou, 714 F.3d. at 706.

1 1d. at 710-11.
157

Cariou, 714 F.3d. at 710-11.

"As indicated above, there are five artworks

that, upon our review, present closer questions. Specifically, Graduation,Meditation, Canal Zone (2008), Canal Zone (2007), and Charlie Company do not

sufficiently differ from the photographs of Cariou's that they incorporate for us
confidently to make a determination about their transformative nature as a matter of law. Although the minimal alterations that Prince made in those instances
moved the work in a different direction from Cariou's classical portraiture and
landscape photos, we cannot say with certainty at this point whether those artworks present a 'new expression, meaning, or message."' (Quoting Campbell,
510 U.S. at 579).
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late level for the twenty-five photos the Second Circuit found
transformative promoted judicial efficiency by preventing the need
for further proceedings. It also prevented the need for expert testimony, which is expensive and still leads to a subjective determination of which pieces of art are aesthetically different enough to
be transformed. On some level, all fair use determinations are subjective because judges weigh the statutory factors based on their
own values and observations about the works at hand. However,
the fact that courts will likely never completely eliminate subjectivity from fair use determinations does not mean that they should
stop trying to eliminate it where they can.
In his dissenting opinion Cariou, Justice Clifford Wallace
points out that the usual process for correcting an erroneous legal
standard used by a trial court is to remand the case. 58 Wallace
suggests that a remand was appropriate in Cariou because factual
determinations needed to be reevaluated and new evidence or expert opinions may have been necessary to determine whether any
of Prince's works were transformative. 59 Wallace did not see how
the appellate court's majority could "confidently" draw a distinction between the twenty-five works it identified as fair uses and the
five works it remanded to the trial court.'
He failed to see the
line because it does not, from an objective legal standpoint, exist.
If a court is to make an aesthetic evaluation that is best done
through the use of experts, not by using judges' personal taste. After all, "'it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth
of [a work], outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.""161

158 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712 (Wallace, dissent).
59

1

16 0

Id. at 712-13.

1d. at 713.

161 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 714 (Wallace, dissent) (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson

LithographingCo., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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B. The Difficulty of Predicting Whether a Work Is
"Transformative"
Even if the appellate court were the appropriate place to
determine whether a work is transformative, there is no apparent
line between what the Second Circuit finds transformative and
non-transformative. The court notes that its conclusion "should
not be taken to suggest.., that any cosmetic changes to the photographs would necessarily constitute a fair use," and that "[a] secondary work may modify the original without being transformative." Yet, the court gives little explanation for how twenty-five
of Prince's works "add[ed] something new" and "presented images
five did not.' 63
with a fundamentally different aesthetic" while
The court recognizes that works that "merely present the same material but in a new form" the way that book synopses of televisions
shows do are not transformative 164 but does not explain how to distinguish between what is classified as an unauthorized derivative
and what constitutes a transformative work that qualifies for fair
use.
The Seventh Circuit cautioned against the reasoning in
65
Cariou precisely because of this lack of clarity. 1 According to
the court in Kienitz, a transformative work is a derivative work
which the original author has the exclusive right to create. The
Second Circuit fails to explain how "transformative uses" can be a
"fair uses" when they extinguish the original author's exclusive
rights under § 106(2). 166 By sticking to the traditional statutory
test, the Seventh Circuit avoids the ambiguity of "transformative
weighing the factors that Congress found imuse," instead
1 67
portant.

162 Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708.
163 Id. (citing Leibowitz v. ParamountPictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114

(1998)).

64Id. at 709 (citing Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143).

165

Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 758.

166

id.

167 id.
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C. Commerciality Matters When DeterminingFairUse

The Second Circuit's finding that the focus should be on
primary rather than potential derivative markets in regard to commerciality is directly at odds with the Supreme Court.' 68 The Second Circuit found that nothing in the record suggested that Cariou
planned to develop or license secondary uses of his works in the
same market as Prince's artworks. 169 While it is unlikely that Cariou, a traditional photographer, would create works like those of
Prince, it is completely conceivable that he would like to obtain licensing fees from artists in Prince's market who wished to create
derivatives. Regardless, any artist using Cariou's works without
paying diminishes the value of his copyright. Why should other
artists license Cariou's works when appropriation artists like
Prince, who do not specifically intend to comment on Cariou's
works, use them for free?
The Second Circuit also minimizes the importance of a gallery show Cariou booked being cancelled as a result of Prince's
works, causing harm to Cariou's primary market for the original
works. The Second Circuit chalked up the cancellation to a misunderstanding, but the gallery owner directly stated that she cancelled because she did not wish to show work that had been "done
already. ,170 As the original artist, Cariou should have to the right
to show his work when he sees fit. There was a considerable
length of time between the publication of Cariou's book and his
intended gallery exhibition, but such an exhibition is foreseeable
for a professional photographer. The law does not place a time
limit on how long an artist may wait to show his work before another artist is authorized to swoop in and claim it as his own, and
relatively unknown artists may have to wait longer to find good
opportunities to exhibit. In this respect, the Second Circuit's reasoning punished Cariou for his relative anonymity. It essentially
gave better known artists like Prince the right to take little known

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590; Harper& Roe, 471 U.S. at 568.
F.3d at 709.
' Cariou, 714 F.3d at 704.

168

169 Cariou, 714
70
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art, make derivatives of it, then sell it in markets that emerging artists have yet to reach, claiming that the emerging artists cannot be
harmed by sales that would have been out of their reach.17 1 If artists like Prince, who are a position to pay for licenses, are not required to do so, artists like Cariou have little chance of success for
two reasons: first, the lesser known artist will not receive any licensing revenue and, secondly, if the lesser known artist finally
breaks into a higher priced market, the appropriation artists already
in that market may have already saturated it with the lesser known
artist's works.
As noted above, the Cariou majority noted derivative
works that merely present the original material in a new format do
not qualify as transformative, using the example of book synopses
of television shows. 1 72 David Nimmer, a legal authority in the
copyright field, points out that this rule would likely apply to motion pictures based on novels and that it is difficult to know what
metric the court applied to determine that art appropriation was a
73
transformative use while the dramatization of a novel was not.'
After all, a film must incorporate "'composition, presentation,
scale, color palette, and media [that] are fundamentally different
and new compared to the' book ...but those consideration, in the
work appeals to an entirely different sort of collector than Cariou's.
Certain of the Canal Zone artworks have sold for two million or more dollars.
The invitation list for a dinner that Gagosian hosted in conjunction with the
opening of the Canal Zone show included a number of the wealthy and famous
such as the musicians Jay-Z and Beyonce Knowles, artists Damien Hirst and
Jeff Koons, professional football player Tom Brady, model Gisele Bundchen, Vanity Faireditor Graydon Carter, Vogue editor Anna Wintour, authors
Jonathan Franzen and Candace Bushnell, and actors Robert DeNiro, Angelina
Jolie, and Brad Pitt. Prince sold eight artworks for a total of $10,480,000, and
exchanged seven others for works by painter Larry Rivers and by sculptor Richard Serra. Cariou on the other hand has not actively marketed his work or sold
work for significant sums, and nothing in the record suggests that anyone will
not now purchase Cariou's work, or derivative non-transformative works
(whether Cariou's own or licensed by him) as a result of the market space that
Prince's work has taken up." 4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05 (2014), (quoting Cariou, 714 F.3d at 709).
172
4-13 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.05
171 "Prince's

173id.
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past, have never led to the blanket conclusion that it is fair use to
4
produce an unauthorized film" based on a literary composition.
It seems that here the Cariou court carved out a special exception
for appropriation art without explaining why.
In Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit considered potential commercial harm to both direct and derivative markets. 175 It determined that the secondary work, a printed t-shirt parodying the
mayor, did not create a substitute for the original photograph. 176 It
pointed out that Kienitz failed to argue that the defendant's products reduced the demand for the original work or any contemplated
use. 177 Kienitz also failed to argue that he had any plan to license
the work for apparel.17 8 Thus, Kienitz may have ultimately lost the
case because he failed to allege the appropriate types of injury.
What is important is that that Seventh Circuit went out of its way
to point out those potential injuries, creating a useable roadmap for
future litigants. Under the Seventh Circuit's approach, potential
market harm to the copyright holder likely weighs strongly in his
or her favor. 179 This stands in stark contrast to the Second Circuit's approach in Cariou, which considered Prince's use fair even
180
though the copyright holder alleged legitimate market damage.
D. Conflicts with the Copyright Statute
In Kienitz, the Seventh Circuit is skeptical about using
"transformativeness" as the core of its fair use analysis because it
is not one of the factors from § 107 and the Second Circuit's use of
it effectively replaces those factors with a single, unclear element.' 8' There is also a concern that the Second Circuit's use of

74

1

Id.

'71

Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 759.

76

1

id.

177 id.
1781id
179 id.

180 Cariou, 714 F.3d. at 708
181

Kienitz, 766 F.3d. at 758.
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transformativeness eviscerates the author's exclusive right to derivative works under § 106. 82
Cariou's standard is not without some merit, depending
upon what the court thinks the goals of copyright are. The Cariou
court's stance seems to be that allowing as many new works as
possible to be created, regardless of any copyright protection that
exists for the underlying work, is the best way to advance Congress' goal of promoting science and useful arts.
In contrast, allowing rampant copying with no clear purpose and no repercussions for failing to obtain a license may very
well undercut the goals of copyright by discouraging original artists from creating new works because of the decreased value of
their copyrights. Licensing gives artists the ability to access one
another's works for a fair price. Cariou incentivizes appropriation
artists to skip paying for a license because there is no penalty for
taking from an original work as long as the court deems the secondary work "transformative." Even if Congress' goals are the
same as the Cariou courts, the Second Circuit's current application
of the transformative use standard causes a problem because it is at
odds with the language of the statute, making the fair use defense
highly unpredictable for all parties.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The Second Circuit has not explained how transformativeness can be used as a factor without nullifying the Copyright statute, nullifying authors' rights, and destroying the licensing market
for original works. It fails to create any useable test to determine
what is transformative enough to fall under fair use and what is infringing, which creates uncertainty for artists and attorneys. A certain amount of subjectivity is unavoidable when determining fair
use, but transformativeness is the least measurable element courts
use. It is highly unpredictable and, therefore, inappropriate to use
as the sole factor for determining fair use. Where transformativeness is used as a factor, determinations of which works are trans-
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formative are properly left to the trial court and should receive
deference from courts of appeals absent abuse of discretion. Due
to these problems, the Seventh Circuit standard is the better standard to follow until either Congress or the Supreme Court endorses
change.
What modem copyright needs is some clarity. To solve the
problems presented by these cases, the Supreme Court needs to
overturn a case following the Cariou line of reasoning and adopt a
clearer standard for the application of the fair use doctrine. The
Supreme Court should clarify how to apply the factors and whether any of the factors receive more weight. The Court needs to decide how to determine transformative use and the appropriate forum for doing so. The Court, or Congress, should also clarify the
goals of copyright when it comes to situations like appropriation
art. The standard needs to remain flexible, but more guidance is
needed for the Circuits to rule in a manner that is predictable both
for copyright holders and persons interested in using copyrighted
works. Whether that clarification should be in favor of the original
copyright holders or appropriation artists making new works is a
matter for Congress to decide, but, without a mandate from that
level, the Second Circuit's reasoning cannot be supported.
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